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Introduction
It is often asked whether it is 
objective material interests or ideas and 
perceptions that are decisive on Turkey’s 
Middle East policy during the AK Party 
era. However, it is quite hard to answer 
this question since the AK party acceded 
to power in a rather critical stage with 
regards to relations with the Middle East. 
At this critical juncture the intellectual 
and structural context of the Middle 
East had been significantly shaped by the 
September 11 terrorist attacks and the 
subsequent Iraq war in 2003. It could be 
therefore argued that many policies that 
emerged with the AK Party government’s 
initiatives and ascribed to intellectual 
factors have actually reflected changes in 
the strategic and structural environment 
surrounding Turkey. This does not mean 
that the AK Party leaders had no effect 
on the formation of policies. However, 
with the advantage of the intellectual 
foundations it represents, the AK Party 
government has been able to portray a 
more flexible and dynamic foreign policy 
perspective as regards the Middle East. 
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Abstract
It is sometimes argued that Turkish foreign 
policy under the AK Party government reflects 
its ideology, and Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East is often used as an illustration 
of this influence. When it is closely examined, 
however, one can easily see that the government 
has often followed a mainly realist foreign 
policy approach in the Middle East and used 
the idealism for the maximization of Turkish 
national interests. In contrast to the power 
resources at the disposal of other regional 
powers, including the support of external 
powers, sectarian identities, or ethnic-linguistic 
ties, the key asset of Turkish foreign policy is its 
successful combination of democracy and Islam. 
Utilizing this image, Turkey has emerged as 
the most outspoken supporter of democratic 
transformations, aiming to create a liberal-
democratic regional order. This, however, brings 
Turkey ultimately into conflict with other 
aspiring hegemonic powers, including both 
Israel and Iran. 
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role in the conflicts between its close 
allies and neighbours. Although Turkey’s 
mediation efforts between Israel and 
Syria as well as between the United States 
and Iran have been aborted, they were 
nevertheless initiatives that emphasized 
assertiveness in Turkish foreign policy. 
By virtue of this proactive attitude 
that numerous foreign observers have 
evaluated as neo-Ottomanism, Turkey 
has embraced for itself an active role 
not only in the Middle East, but also in 
Central Asia and Northern Africa.2 
In this article, a general perspective 
on the Middle Eastern policy that 
Turkey has pursued in the last ten years 
will be presented by examining Turkey’s 
relations with four power blocs in the 
region: (1) Israel, (2) Iran, (3) the Arab 
countries that are within Iran’s sphere of 
influence (Iraq, Syria and Lebanon) and 
(4) the Arab countries which stand in 
opposition to Iran’s increasing dominance 
in the region (apart from Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and 
Bahrain). Evidently this categorization 
shows that the most significant factor 
in Turkish foreign policy making vis-à-
vis the Middle East is the emergence of 
Iran’s regional hegemony.
In the AK Party era, Turkey has 
succeeded in returning to the region 
as a normal power without having an 
historical fixation. In this sense, it could 
be argued that AK Party government, 
with its strong mandate, has realized 
a revision in foreign policy that could 
not be completed following the end of 
the Cold War due to domestic political 
instability. The AK Party has projected 
to the region a vision that emphasizes 
secular democracy and its compatibility 
with Islam. As Fuller indicates “For 
most Arabs, the election of a mildly 
Islamist party in Ankara exemplified 
that countries, which shares common 
heritage and history can unite one 
day.”1 As a symbolic expression of 
this reunification, Turkey facilitated 
the election of Prof. Dr. Ekmeleddin 
İhsanoğlu, an academic who is closely 
acquainted with the region, as the 
General Secretary of the Organization 
of Islamic Conference in 2005 in the 
first democratic elections conducted in 
the history of the organization. It was 
a symbolic expression of the message 
that the Islamic world and the Middle 
East are, from now on, located at the 
centre of Turkish foreign policy and that 
Turkey desires to see materialization of a 
democratic Islamic world. 
In accordance with Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu’s policy target of “zero 
problems with neighbours”, Turkey 
moved to assert itself as a central player 
in the region by playing a mediatory 
The outbreak of the Arab 
democratic revolts in the winter 
of 2010-2011 caused a dramatic 
rupture in this regard by forcing 
a revision of foreign policy.
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general elections, many internal and 
external political observers were curious 
about the nature of the new government’s 
Israeli policies. According to some circles, 
this subject was a litmus test of the new 
government’s loyalty to secularism. 
Subsequent to the February 28 process, 
even a slight deviation from the pro-
Israeli perspective was seen as sufficient 
to reveal its Islamic identity. Presumably, 
taking these concerns into consideration, 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan before assuming 
the post of Prime Minister paid a visit 
to Washington and held meetings at 
several key Jewish institutions where he 
expressed a strong will to further develop 
the relations between Turkey and 
Israel.3 Accordingly, until the outbreak 
of the 2008 Gaza War, the AK Party 
government maintained the usual course 
of Turkish-Israeli relations. 
It could thus be claimed that the 
AK Party kept its commitment to 
the relationship, which resulted in a 
spectacular growth in the volume of trade 
between the two countries. Whilst the 
Under the AK Party rule, Turkey 
followed a foreign policy towards 
the region that emphasized bilateral 
relationships that often ignored internal 
characteristics of regimes, particularly 
human rights issues in Syria and Iran, 
emphasizing instead strengthening trade 
relations. In this sense it was realist with 
regard to acceptance of existing regimes 
as partners and liberal in the sense of 
placing heavy emphasis on economic 
integration. The outbreak of the Arab 
democratic revolts in the winter of 2010-
2011 caused a dramatic rupture in this 
regard by forcing a revision of foreign 
policy, according to which Turkey 
emerged as the champion of democratic 
transformations in North Africa. The 
victim of this revision, however, was the 
strategic partnership with the Syrian 
regime that Turkey had built in the 
last decade. Under the cloak of Turkish 
democracy promotion in Syria lies a 
realist mindset regarding the rise of an 
Iran-led Shia bloc, which Turkey so far 
attempted to manage diplomatically. 
Also in this regard, Turkey’s activism 
regarding the Palestinian question, 
leading to a deep crisis with Israel, helped 
trim Iran’s regional influence. 
Tension in the Turkish-Israeli 
Relations: AK Party’s Secret 
Agenda?
Following the establishment of the 
AK Party government after the 2002 
Following the establishment of 
the AK Party government after 
the 2002 general elections, 
many internal and external 
political observers were curious 
about the nature of the new 
government’s Israeli policies.
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the development of an anti-American 
and anti-Israeli public sentiment in 
Turkey. US President George W. Bush’s 
description of the Israeli Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon as “a man of peace” 
provoked strong reactions in the Turkish 
public opinion.5
The American invasion of Iraq in 
2003 was the most important event 
that changed the strategic context of the 
Middle East, and in turn, affected the 
course of Turkish-Israeli relations. This 
has undoubtedly left a deep impact on 
the Turkish public opinion contributing 
to an already strong 
resentment against 
American foreign 
policy as well as Israel 
which was the only 
country in the region 
which supported the 
invasion. At the same 
time, the Iraqi war 
disrupted the traditional calculations 
regarding Turkish foreign policy within 
the Turkish political system due to the 
Northern Iraqi problem. The war helped 
the Iraqi Kurds emerge as a new actor 
in the region, and as a result, ensured 
that certain revisions in Turkey’s internal 
and external political decisions were 
inevitable. With the new geo-strategic 
calculations that emerged on the Kurdish 
question, Turkey established close 
security relations with Syria and Iran. 
The Turkish-Israeli strategic alliance, 
which existed partially to end the 
trade volume between Israel and Turkey 
was 1.3 billion US dollars in 2002, this 
had risen to 3.38 billion US dollars in 
2008. In 2009, Turkey’s exports to Israel 
totalled 1.5 billion US dollars, whereas 
its imports had reached 1.7 billion 
US dollars. More significantly, Turkey 
signed several defence contracts with 
Israel, including the purchase of ten 
Israeli-made unmanned aerial vehicles, 
which amounted to 2 billion US dollars. 
However, it should also be mentioned 
that the value of the trade relations with 
Israel constituted a very modest sum 
of one percent of 
Turkey’s total trade 
volume. In contrast 
to this, Turkey’s trade 
volume with the 
22 Arab states had 
reached at 30 billion 
US dollars during 
the five years before 
2008 and 40 billion 
US dollars in 2008. As for the Turkish-
Iranian trade volume, this figure climbed 
above 10.5 billion US dollars in 2010.4
However, the political relations 
between the two countries have been 
heavily hindered by a series of actions 
by Israel. The offensive orchestrated 
by Israel against the refugee camp in 
Jenin in April 2002, had occurred only 
months before the AK Party government 
took office. This attack, which had the 
nature of a massacre, and the subsequent 
US support, directly contributed to 
The American invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 was the most important 
event that changed the strategic 
context of the Middle East, and 
in turn, affected the course of 
Turkish-Israeli relations
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towards Hamas’s liaison with Turkey in 
order to avoid pushing Hamas to Iran’s 
ranks.7 Ross Wilson, who was appointed 
as the US ambassador in Ankara to replace 
the arch neo-conservative Eric Edelman, 
and represented this pragmatic and realist 
perspective also placed the meeting on a 
positive framework.8 Meanwhile, from 
the perspective of Hamas, building good 
relations with Turkey was critical for 
earning diplomatic legitimacy as well 
as for reducing its dependency on Iran.9 
Nevertheless, the pro-Israeli circles in 
the United States criticized the visit very 
strongly, stating that “Islamist” AK Party 
foreign policy architects were responsible 
for the Hamas visit.10
Despite these moments of crisis, 
the AK Party government continued 
the security dimension of relations 
with Israel. It employed these contacts 
to broker negotiations between Israel 
and Syria, the Arab state that Turkey 
now enjoyed close relations with. In 
the context of Turkey’s approach to 
regional politics that placed diplomacy 
at the centre, Israel’s surprise attack on 
Gaza between December 2008 and 
January 2009 was received with strong 
condemnation from Ankara. According 
to the report issued by the US-based 
Human Rights Watch approximately 
1500 Palestinians lost their lives as a 
result of this attack in which white 
phosphorus bombs were dropped on 
civilian population.11 The Turkish 
government was surprised since Israel 
support Syria was providing to the PKK 
at that time, lost its meaning within this 
new conjuncture. 
Israel’s assassination of the seventy-
year-old quadriplegic leader of Hamas, 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, and Abdulaziz 
Rantisi who was subsequently chosen to 
replace Yassin, provoked strong reactions 
in the Turkish public opinion, especially 
the grassroots of the AK Party. In the 
face of these events, Prime Minister 
Erdoğan increased his criticism towards 
Israel stating with a clear voice that 
these targeted assassinations amounted 
to “state terrorism”.6 In February 2006, 
a Hamas committee led by Khaled 
Mashal visited Ankara and met with 
some Turkish authorities. The Turkish 
media and the main opposition party 
CHP considered this as a great mistake 
in terms of relations with the West. 
Whereas Tel Aviv strongly criticized 
this visit, interestingly, Washington 
avoided making any direct criticism and 
stated that what really mattered were 
the messages that were given to Hamas. 
Despite being perceived and regarded in 
the West as a violent Islamic movement, 
it was an undeniable fact that Hamas 
enjoyed a strong support base in what 
was accepted as the Palestinian territories, 
having emerged as the winner in the 
democratic elections that the United 
States promoted. This posed a real 
dilemma. Seemingly, the realist flank in 
the US administration led by Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice was warm 
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concrete development that strained the 
relations between Turkey and Israel was 
the exclusion of Israel from the military 
manoeuvres, that were to be conducted 
within the framework of NATO, in 
Turkey in January 2009 as a reaction to 
Israel’s Gaza attacks. The manoeuvres 
were postponed indefinitely when the 
USA and Italy also announced that they 
would not be joining as a reaction to 
Israel’s exclusion.12 In response, Turkey 
conducted its first joint manoeuvres with 
Syria in April 2009.13
After this event Israel openly started 
to have an attitude towards Turkey. As 
evidence that proves Israel’s reaction, in 
January 2010 the Israeli deputy Foreign 
Minister Danny Ayalon invited the 
Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv making 
him sit in a lower chair than his own 
and spoke against Turkey, in Hebrew, to 
Israeli television cameras in front of the 
ambassador. Although Israel explained 
this attitude as a reaction to a Turkish 
television series airing on the TRT called 
“Ayrılık”, depicting the slaughter of 
Palestinian children by Israeli soldiers, it 
carried out the attack despite a verbal 
peace promise made by Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Olmert during his visit to 
Ankara just a couple of days prior to the 
offensive. In reaction, Ankara declared 
the end of its mediatory mission between 
Syria and Israel. The government also 
ensured that the children injured in the 
attacks would be brought to Turkey and 
receive treatment in Turkish hospitals. 
Prime Minister Erdoğan and his wife 
visited those children in hospitals and 
followed up on their situation personally. 
Erdoğan family’s close attention to 
the Palestinian crisis has been closely 
followed by the Turkish as well as the 
Arab public through satellite television 
networks. The reaction by the Turkish 
public to Israel’s disproportionate use of 
force in Gaza was massive. From Istanbul 
to Diyarbakir, demonstrations protesting 
the Gaza attack were held in nearly every 
city and town throughout the country. 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 
abandonment of a panel during the 
2009 Davos Summit, in which he 
was accompanied by Israeli President 
Shimon Peres, Secretary General of 
the United Nations Ban Ki Moon and 
Secretary General of the Arab League 
Amr Moussa, in condemnation of the 
Israeli aggression was the most dramatic 
event displaying Turkey’s reaction. 
During the panel Erdoğan quite 
straightforwardly told Peres “You know 
how to kill children very well!” A more 
Israeli navy commandoes 
attacked the largest ship of the 
convoy, the Mavi Marmara, 
killing nine Turkish people, 
one of whom with American 
citizenship. 
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an act of piracy. Erdoğan cut his tour 
short and returned to Ankara, sending 
his Foreign Minister to New York to call 
the United Nations Security Council, 
on which Turkey was then a non-
permanent member, to an emergency 
meeting. Describing Israeli aggression as 
state terrorism, Erdoğan expressed that 
Israel showed the entire world the levels 
it reached in killing civilians and that 
Turkey’s enmity would be as thorough as 
its friendship.15
Despite the negative comments by 
some circles within the Turkish media, 
Erdoğan’s severe criticisms of Israel 
did not receive a strong reaction from 
domestic political actors. One possible 
reason for this might be that despite 
the government’s strong criticisms of 
Israel, the defence contracts signed with 
this country largely continued until 
recent days. When it is considered that 
Turkey, following a liberal economic 
understanding, permitted the investment 
of Israeli firms in telecommunication 
and agricultural sectors, it could be 
said that the AK Party follows a course 
that does not represent the presumed 
ideological perceptions with regards 
to foreign trade. For example, the 
contract providing satellite pictures for 
the Turkish Air Forces was signed for 
141 million dollars with the companies 
Israeli Aerospace and Elbit.16 From this 
perspective, the reason for the political 
tension in Turkish-Israeli relations 
should not be sought in the political 
still had to issue a written apology as a 
result of Ankara’s strong response. 
Prime Minister Erdoğan, in his 
speech at the opening of TRT’s Arabic 
television TRT et-Turkiye, described 
Israel as the real threat to the region. 
Turkey’s statement that it would not 
stay silent in the face of another Israeli 
attack towards Gaza was an indication 
of the final stage of the tough language 
against Israel.14 In the meantime, Turkey 
increasingly started to bring up the 
contradiction of the international powers 
by comparing the nuclear weapons in 
Israel’s possession and the sanctions 
against Iran. Israel did not attend the 
2010 Nuclear Security Summit as it was 
afraid that Turkey might bring up this 
subject to the agenda. In return, Israeli 
Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman 
made statements comparing Erdoğan to 
the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. 
Among all these, the most dramatic 
development that permanently unsettled 
Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations was the 
attack conducted by Israel on the Gaza 
aid flotilla comprised heavily of Turkish 
citizens. Israeli navy commandoes 
attacked the largest ship of the convoy, 
the Mavi Marmara, killing nine Turkish 
people, one of whom with American 
citizenship. Turkey’s immediate reaction 
came from the deputy Prime Minister 
Bülent Arınç, while Erdoğan was in 
the midst of an official tour to several 
Latin American nations. In a cautious 
language, Arınç described the attack as 
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was perceived as an indirect support 
given to the PKK. 
The Turkish government presented 
Israel a list of demands that includes an 
apology, compensation to the relatives 
of the victims and a lift of the embargo 
placed on Gaza from Israel as conditions 
to relieve tension and normalize the 
relations. The secret meeting held in 
July 2010 between the Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu and Israeli Minister 
for Industry and Trade Binyamin Ben-
Eliezer produced no outcome, either. 
By including within its demands Israel’s 
lifting of the embargo on Gaza was a 
clear message to Palestinian and the 
Arab public opinion that Turkey saw the 
Palestinian issue within the scope of its 
national interests. 
The last episode in the crisis took 
place when the UN-commissioned 
Palmer-Uribe report on the 2010 Gaza 
flotilla attack was leaked to the New York 
Times.18 According to the report, the 
Israeli-imposed blockage on Gaza was 
acceptable and the Israel’s intervention 
on the blockade area was justified 
from an international legal perspective. 
Furthermore, according to the report, the 
Israeli commandoes faced ‘organized and 
violent resistance’ and were compelled 
to use force as an act of self-defense. 
Yet the Israeli forces’ use of ‘excessive 
and unreasonable force’ and the Israeli 
military’s treatment of passengers was 
found abusive. Turkish member of the 
panel, Özdem Sanberk, wrote a separate 
ideology that AK party represents, but 
rather in the paradigm shift that took 
place in the way the Turkish political elite 
interprets Middle Eastern geography 
and the geo-political environment. At 
this point, the increasing power of Iraqi 
Kurds and Iran, as a result of the new 
power distribution after the Iraqi war, 
reveals new developments that should be 
emphasized.17
The disappointment caused by 
Israel’s neutral stance during the crisis 
Turkey experienced with Syria over 
the PKK in 1998 increasingly led the 
perception that Israel stands opposed 
to Turkey with regard to the Kurdish 
question. However, this was precisely 
why Turkey had set up an alliance with 
Israel. In 2003, the support of Israel 
and the pro-Israeli groups in the United 
States for the war against Iraq, a war 
which stood against Turkish interests, 
was noted by the Turkish political elite. 
Israel’s further support for the Kurdish 
autonomous structure in Northern Iraq 
The Turkish government 
presented Israel a list of 
demands that includes an 
apology, compensation to the 
relatives of the victims and a lift 
of the embargo placed on Gaza 
from Israel as conditions in to 
relieve tension and normalize 
the relations. 
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in the island is addressed first and the 
naval boundaries are demarcated with 
agreement, Greek Cypriots’ claim of 
the area as its exclusive economic zone 
carries no international legitimacy. Yet, 
unable to prevent the Greek gas drilling, 
Turkey moved ahead to sign its own 
underwater exploration agreement with 
Northern Cypriot government to carry 
out its own drilling.22 
While the fate of relations depends 
on whether or not Israel meets the 
primary Turkish condition of apology, 
such an apology is highly difficult to 
come, particularly after the release 
of the Palmer-Uribe report. Also, it 
is highly questionable whether a late 
apology would restore the relations back 
to its normalcy. According to Israeli 
sources, the Israeli government appears 
to make the strategic decision not to 
apologize because apology may not 
reverse the tide in relations between the 
two countries. In case of an apology, as 
note of objection pointing out that 
the legality of the blockade was itself 
challenged by the UN Human Rights 
Council and the passengers onboard 
Mavi Marmara resisted to defend 
themselves. Sanberk suggests that the 
report omits the fact that the Israeli 
troops opened fire on the passengers 
from the helicopters before boarding of 
Israeli commanders and some passengers 
were deliberately shot dead by the Israeli 
forces.19 Several international critics 
of the report point out that the panel 
that prepared the report questionably 
included as its deputy chair the former 
Columbian President Alvaro Uribe who 
was criticized for human rights abuses 
during his term in office.20
In reaction to leaking of the report, 
Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu 
immediately announced a series of 
measures against Israel, including most 
significantly the expulsion of the Israeli 
ambassador and the downgrading of its 
diplomatic representation to the level of 
second secretary. He also announced that 
Turkey would take all necessary measures 
to ensure the safety of sea navigation in 
the Mediterranean Sea. Turkish anger at 
Israel was not only related to the lack of 
apology but also to the Israeli cooperation 
with Greek Cypriot government in 
natural gas drilling in waters south of 
Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot natural gas 
drilling, being carried out by Texas-based 
Noble, enjoys Israeli air force cover.21 
Turkey claims that, unless the dispute 
Turkish Foreign Minister 
Davutoğlu immediately 
announced a series of measures 
against Israel, including most 
significantly the expulsion of 
the Israeli ambassador and the 
downgrading of its diplomatic 
representation to the level of 
second secretary.
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different political actors. This is not only 
a result of Iran’s existing Islamic regime, 
but also of Turkey’s historically-rooted 
rivalry with this nation. Not allowing 
its relationship with Iran to be shaped 
by perceptions, Turkey carried out a 
cautious, but close diplomatic relations 
with Iran in the last ten years. As regards 
dealing with the Kurdish question, a 
complete alliance was established in 
economic and security areas. With this 
diplomacy-first approach, Turkey was 
able to desecuritize its relations with 
both Iran and Syria.25
It is not possible to explain the policy 
of the AK Party government towards 
these two countries with the ideological 
foundations of the party leadership. 
Undoubtedly, Iran and Syria are two 
powerful neighbours that cannot be 
disregarded by Turkey and the Turkish 
business world. As a matter of fact, 
former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, 
who was an ardent secularist, visited Iran 
after Bush defined Iran as part of the “axis 
of evil” in 2002 and signed two treaties 
that aimed to strengthen economic and 
cultural cooperation.26 Furthermore, 
Sezer confirmed the beginning of a 
new era in relations between the two 
countries by attending the funeral 
service of the late Syrian President Hafez 
Al-Assad. The AK Party leadership very 
much embraced the same approach and 
further developed a nearly problem-free 
relationship with Iran at least on the 
surface level. In essence, however, Turkey 
the Israeli government suspects, “the 
Turkish government could present this 
as a vindication of its policies, gaining 
more points in the region and giving no 
assurances that it would stop its [verbal] 
attacks on Israel.”23 
Arguably the principal party 
responsible for this crisis in relations 
between the two countries is Israeli 
policies that completely disregard 
international law. In so doing Israel 
considers itself unaccountable relying 
on the unquestioned exclusive support it 
receives from the United States. Turkey 
strongly criticizes the US acquiescence of 
the Israeli aggression in open seas and its 
silence in the face of murder of Furkan 
Doğan, an American citizen, by Israeli 
commandoes at close distance multiple 
times. Turkey’s decision not to reduce 
the Israeli diplomatic status following 
the flotilla incident, in which Turkish 
citizens were murdered, was met with 
strong negative reaction by the domestic 
public opinion. The public mood against 
Israel is so strong that even the PKK is 
irked at any suggestion of receiving help 
from Israel when such an idea was raised 
by the Israeli officials.24
Turkey’s Deep Geo-political 
Rivalry with Iran
Turkey’s perception of Iran varied 
in accordance with the ideological 
foundations and the political outlook of 
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Turkey felt it necessary to gain more 
prominence in the Palestinian question 
and win hearts and minds of the Arab 
public. However, until very recently, 
Turkey did not pursue a policy that 
confronts the Shia bloc and expressed 
that an Iran integrated within the system 
is very important for regional peace and 
stability. The main logic in this calculation 
was that Iran was in a particularly critical 
position with regard to Iraq’s stability 
with implications for the Kurdish 
question. In this 
framework, Turkey 
followed a pragmatic 
and integrationist 
policy towards Iran 
as different from the 
axis of the Arab world 
and that of Israel and 
the United States. 
Turkey is aware that 
confronting Iran 
will not stop it from 
acquiring nuclear 
weapons, but on the contrary, further 
accelerate this process. Turkey grants 
Iran its right to nuclear energy as a result 
of its increasing influence and decreasing 
natural resources and natural rights 
arising from international law. Together 
with Brazil, Turkey has played an active 
role in overcoming Iran’s nuclear crisis by 
means of a uranium swap scheme. Along 
with Brazil, it was the only country to 
vote no on the sanctions brought against 
Iran in the UN Security Council. 
remained cautious regarding Iran and 
its emergence as a regional hegemon 
following the Iraq War of 2003. 
Undoubtedly, unlike others in the 
region, Turkey does not see Iran as an 
existential security threat, but as a rival 
in terms of impact and influence, a 
significant trade partner and natural gas 
supply source without which Turkey 
had to completely rely on Russia, and 
an operational ally against the PKK 
terrorism. Nevertheless, policy-makers 
in Ankara are deeply concerned about 
the profoundly 
increased power of 
Iran in the regional 
geopolitical structure 
that emerged after 
the Iraq War. In this 
new environment, it 
is necessary to state 
that Turkey’s two 
Arab neighbours, 
Iraq and Syria, are 
now within Iran’s 
sphere of influence, which is an 
unprecedented development in the entire 
history of Turkish-Iranian competition. 
Due to this chain of alliance, Iran has 
effectively become a Mediterranean 
power and many Arab leaders including 
the Jordanian King Abdullah II spoke of 
an emerging Shia crescent, encapsulating 
the area from Bahrain to Lebanon, and 
to the fear of many Sunni Arab regimes, 
might turn into a Shia full moon.27 For 
this reason, in order to decrease Iran’s 
impact in the Middle East in general, 
Turkey does not see Iran as an 
existential security threat, but 
as a rival in terms of impact and 
influence, a significant trade 
partner and natural gas supply 
source without which Turkey 
had to completely rely on 
Russia, and an operational ally 
against the PKK terrorism.
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target Malatya in case of an Israeli attack 
against its nuclear facilities.29 Most likely 
in response to such threats, Turkey would 
like to strengthen its missile defence 
capabilities by purchasing Patriot PAC-
3 anti-missile batteries from the United 
States.30 
The Iranian Sphere of 
Influence in the Arab World
Syria, Iraq and Lebanon are three 
critically important countries for 
Turkey. Turkey has a historically-rooted 
fierce rivalry with Iran in this region. 
However, a soft geopolitical competition 
is currently on the agenda. With the 
Iraqi war completing the puzzle by 
bringing Shia elements to power, Iran 
is now able to reach the Mediterranean 
thanks to its sphere of influence over 
three countries. In addition, Iran 
with Syria and Iraq completely closes 
Turkey’s geographic reach to the rest of 
the region, with a combined border of 
nearly 1800 kilometres. These countries 
also are of critical importance to Turkish 
security interests due to the Kurdish 
question. As a result of the Iraq war, an 
autonomous political Kurdish presence 
emerged, which Turkey has to take 
into consideration from political and 
economic aspects. In the meantime, 
both Iran and Syria have not completely 
abandoned their interest in using the 
PKK card against Turkey.
It was also with this strategic 
mindset that the AK Party government 
was amongst the first governments 
to congratulate the Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad after his 
disputed 2009 presidential election 
victory. Although this attitude was 
sharply criticised by Iranian liberals, 
Turkey was not convinced by any 
evidence that indicates fraud in the 
elections and did not make it a part of its 
policy to intervene in domestic politics 
of Iran with the expectation, of course, 
that Iran adhered to the same principle. 
Interestingly, the Iraqi and Afghani 
governments almost competed with 
each other to congratulate Ahmedinejad 
despite being under the invasion of 
American troops.28 
As will be discussed in the following 
section, Turkey’s diplomatically cordial 
relationship towards the Shia bloc has 
dramatically changed after the Arab 
popular revolts, especially after they 
encapsulated Syria. Iran clearly sees Syria 
as an indispensable part of its sphere of 
influence in the region and after Turkey 
began to pressure Syrian regime to be 
respectful of the democratic demands of 
its people, majority of whom are Sunnis, 
Iranian military circles have directed 
against Turkey some harsh statements. 
It was in this context that Ankara 
accepted to deploy NATO early warning 
system in the southeastern province. In 
reaction, a senior commander in Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guard stated that it will 
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In the course of next few years, 
Turkish-Syrian relations were improved 
to the point that the two states declared 
mutual removal of visa requirement in 
2009. As of 2010, civilian human traffic 
between the two countries has reached 
100 thousand people per month. While 
only twenty thousand Turkish citizens 
visited Syria in 1990, this number 
reached a record of one million.32 
In parallel, Turkish government 
moved to waive visa requirements for 
Lebanese and Jordanian citizens visiting 
Turkey. In addition, Turkey led in the 
establishment of a free trade zone to 
include Syria, Lebanon and Jordan 
creating a market of 100 million people. 
In July 2010, the “Close Neighbours 
Economic and Trade Association 
Council” (CNETAC) to include the 
same countries was created to research the 
possibility of cooperation and integration 
in different economic sectors. Turkey’s 
3 billion dollars worth of trade with 
Syria, Lebanon and Jordan constituted 
around ten per cent of Turkey’s total 
trade volume with the Arab world, far 
exceeding its trade level with Israel worth 
2.5 billion US dollars.33
Syria was often cited as the most 
successful diplomatic undertaking of 
the AK Party government in the last few 
years as a realization of “zero problem 
with neighbours” ideal. Although the 
normalization of Turkish-Syria relations 
started before the AK Party government, 
the contribution of the AK Party 
government in the development of these 
relations was indisputable. 
The death of Hafz al-Assad who 
pursued anti-Turkish policies and 
supported terrorism meant the end of 
another serious obstacle for the betterment 
of Turkish-Syrian relationship. In protest 
for Turkey’s ambitious Southeastern 
Anatolia Project (GAP), hydroelectric 
project which allegedly decreased 
quantity of Euphrates water flowing into 
Syria, Hafiz Al-Assad developed a policy 
of supporting PKK terrorism and moved 
to develop an alliance with Greece. In 
response, Turkey supported Israel in an 
attempt to create a bloc. In 1998, Turkey 
threatened Syria with a military offensive 
if it did not close the PKK camps in Syria 
and hand over leaders of the PKK. Syria 
complied with these demands easing the 
way to start diplomatic and economic 
relations between the two countries. The 
prospects of good relations were further 
improved when Beshar al-Assad who was 
regarded as more pragmatic and liberal 
replaced his father in 2000 following 
his death. Meanwhile Turkey supported 
Beshar during his deep family power 
struggle with his uncle, Rifaat al-Assad.31 
In March 2011, public revolts 
similar to the ones that toppled 
regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and 
Libya soon encapsulated Syria, 
leading to massive uprising in 
Syria.
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in Damascus burning the Turkish flag. 
Meanwhile, quite interestingly, Israel is 
ambivalent in its stance regarding the fate 
of Assad despite his support to Hezbollah 
and Hamas. For Israelis, it is easier to 
deal with the regime in Damascus since 
“it represents a coherent state with more 
reliable leadership.”35 One can interpret 
this line as an Israeli preference to see the 
continuation of Syria’s minority regime 
to a new democratic political system 
in which pro-Islamic parties ascend to 
power as they did elsewhere in the region. 
The present tension in Turkish-
Syrian relations spells the end of Turkish 
diplomatic handling of Iranian sphere 
of influence, as well Turkey’s following 
a non-conventional foreign policy in the 
region distancing itself from the position 
of the West. While Turkish-Israeli tension 
is a clear indication that Ankara does 
not necessarily synchronize its foreign 
policy with that of Washington, it is also 
interesting that the same tension does 
not create an obstacle for an unusually 
warm relationship between the AK Party 
government and Obama administration. 
Ironically, Iraqi Prime Minister 
Nouri al-Maliki who himself came to 
power following Iraq war of 2003 voices 
support to Assad.36 This was a predictable 
outcome of the Iraq war, in addition to 
creating suitable conditions for a de facto 
independence to Northern Iraqi Kurdish 
groups resulting in serious implications 
for its fight with the PKK terrorism. With 
the coming to power of Shiite majority 
Unfortunately, the honeymoon in 
Turkish-Syrian relations was not to last 
long. In March 2011, public revolts 
similar to the ones that toppled regimes 
in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya soon 
encapsulated Syria, leading to massive 
uprising. The Syrian Baath Party regime 
in power since 1963 reacted to the events 
with violence despite attempts by Turkey 
to convince al-Assad to lead a peaceful 
transformation. According to a report 
published by the United Nations, Syrian 
regime utilized brutality against civilians, 
including torture and rape of under-aged 
children.34 
The 22-member Arab League 
took the initiative to pressure Syria 
to end its violence and when it failed 
in these attempts expelled it from 
the organization. In August, the UN 
Security Council adopted a statement 
condemning Syria’s violence; yet, due 
to Russian and Chinese objections, it 
has failed to pass a resolution involving 
economic measures against Syria. 
Turkey fully cooperates with the Arab 
League, the United States and Europe in 
imposing sanctions against Syria while 
the Baath regime is given firm support 
by Russia, China, Iran and Hezbollah. 
In response to Turkish position, Syria 
cancelled its free trade agreement with 
Turkey prompting the latter to impose 
30 per cent customs duty on products 
entering from Syria. In addition, 
provoking Ankara’s strong protest, a pro-
Assad mob attacked the Turkish embassy 
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since they increasingly recognize that 
their isolation cannot be ended by Israel. 
In fact, in the realm of economics, 
Northern Iraq is a lucrative market for 
Turkish companies, particularly in trade 
and construction sectors. As a result of 
this interaction, Turkey’s export to Iraq, 
much of which is to Northern Iraq, 
grew from around 900 million dollars 
in 2003 to 6 billion dollars in 2009. In 
the meantime, Turkish NGOs invested 
in education from primary schools to 
universities. The fate of this relationship, 
however, rests on the relationship 
between the Northern Iraqi authority 
and the PKK, as well as on the success of 
Turkish democratization as regards to its 
own Kurdish question. 
Turkey seeks to play an active role 
in Lebanon to help mediate sectarian 
divisions countering Iranian efforts to 
gain influence. In November 2010, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan visited 
Lebanon shortly after Iranian President 
Ahmedinejad’s visit to the same country 
in October of the same year and was 
enthusiastically received by the Sunni-
led government. 
Lebanese politics is deeply divided 
between the March 14 alliance led by 
Saad Hariri who is supported by Saudi 
Arabia and the United States, and the 
March 8 alliance led by Hezbollah and 
supported by Syria and Iran. In 2008, a 
clash between Hezbollah and followers 
of then Prime Minister Saad Hariri 
over his decision to close a Hezbollah 
in Iraq, Iran has closed the geographic 
gap between itself and its Syrian ally, 
reaching to the Mediterranean Sea. 
Despite all these negative 
developments, Turkey avoided moves that 
would threaten stability in Iraq. On the 
contrary, it tried to provide integration of 
all parties, most significantly Sunni Arab 
groups by ensuring their involvement in 
Iraqi national politics and 2005 general 
elections. 
Undoubtedly, having a clear majority 
in the population, the Shiite Arab parties 
dominate any election results, leading 
to the outcome of Iranian influence in 
Iraqi politics. Recognizing this reality, 
Turkey has attempted to build ties with 
the Shiite Arabs. In March 2011, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan became the first Sunni 
leader to have visited the mausoleum of 
Ali, son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad 
in Najaf. The Prime Minister, during 
the same visit, organised a sincere 
discussion regarding the future of Iraq 
with the most prominent Shia leader in 
Iraq, Ayatollah Sistani, who is regarded 
as the most influential figure in Iraqi 
politics. The fact that Sistani is Persian 
and of Iranian citizenship, however, 
is an indicator of the depth of Iran’s 
historically-rooted influence in the 
country. In this regard, Turkey does not 
have any chance to compete with Iran 
over gaining popularity of the country’s 
Shia Arab population. Recognition of 
this fact in the new realist context will 
force Turkey to approach Iraqi Kurds, 
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central position in Middle East politics 
and ultimately increases its rivalry with 
Iran. In this regard, Lebanese crisis 
shows shifting balance of power in the 
region where, as Anthony Shadid notes, 
“Turkey has proved the most dynamic, 
projecting an increasingly assertive and 
independent foreign policy in an Arab 
world bereft of any country that matches 
its stature.”37 
Showing the volatile nature of 
Lebanese politics, the Lebanese political 
division further increased following the 
events in Syria. Hezbollah firmly supports 
the Syrian regime causing friction in 
the March 8 coalition, and the March 
14 coalition backs the opposition.38 In 
this new context, as Turkey has clearly 
distanced itself from Syria and taken 
an active position to force a democratic 
transformation in its neighbour, it will 
not be able to maintain its claimed role 
as a neutral arbiter in Lebanese politics. 
The Sunni Arab Bloc
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia perceive 
Iran as an existential threat from their 
traditional foreign policy perspectives 
due to their own Shia populations, 
while the United Arab Emirates has a 
troublesome relationship with Tehran 
due to Iranian controlled group of islands 
in the Gulf. One can add to this group 
Egypt, the most populous Arab nation 
that is also disturbed by Iran’s increasing 
power in the Middle East and the 
telecommunications facility broke out 
and left 80 people dead. Qatar then 
brokered a deal that ended the conflict. 
Yet the tension has returned, when a UN-
backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
investigating the 2005 assassination of 
Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri indicted four senior Hezbollah 
members of involvement in the incident. 
Eleven Hezbollah-led opposition 
ministers in the coalition government 
resigned in protest of Prime Minister 
Hariri’s refusal to reject the Tribunal, 
causing its collapse in January 2011. 
In all of these events, Turkey assumed 
an active diplomatic stance especially 
through regular trilateral summit 
meetings with Syria and Qatar to resolve 
the crisis. In the absence of Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt as large Arab powers to play an 
effective role in regional politics, Turkey 
enlisted the support of Qatar, a tiny but 
diplomatically influential Gulf state. 
The crisis of government was solved 
when March 8 coalition managed to 
convince Sunni politician Najeb Mikati 
to become the Prime Minister and thus 
form the government. Still, Turkey’s 
active diplomacy in Lebanon indicates its 
Showing the volatile nature of 
Lebanese politics, the Lebanese 
political division further 
increased following the events 
in Syria. 
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for the regime change in Egypt and 
expressed their appreciation for Egypt’s 
efforts towards achieving Palestinian 
reconciliation. Both countries have 
shared concerns regarding Israel and 
Iran. The Freedom and Justice Party, 
established by the Muslim Brotherhood, 
emerged as the strongest in the recent 
elections and will be playing an 
important part in Egypt’s future. In 
contrast to its main competitor, the 
Salafi al-Nour party, which is closer to 
Saudi Arabian interpretation of Islam, 
Freedom and Justice Party sees the 
AK Party as a model for the country’s 
democratic transformation. 
Saudi Arabia is at some distance from 
Turkish interpretation of democracy and 
its compatibility with Islam. The strict 
interpretation of Wahhabism, Saudi 
official teaching of Islam, regards Shia 
in extreme hostility terms. In Saudi 
perceptions, Iran is an existential threat 
mainly because of the Shia minority 
which constitutes approximately 10-
15% of its population. What is more 
critical is that this population lives in the 
oil rich Gulf area of the Kingdom. Saudi 
Arabia takes the most active position 
as regards to the expansion of Iranian 
sphere of influence. The latest indicator 
of this was Saudi Arabia’s sending troops 
to help repress the public uprising in 
Bahrain, where more than sixty per cent 
of the population adhere to the Shia sect.
The Saudis expect Turkey to employ 
a tougher stance on Iran and are 
Mediterranean region. Although Egypt 
maintained a hostile relationship with 
Iran during the Mubarak era, after the 
toppling of Mubarak regime, it showed 
some gestures to Iran, allowing Iranian 
warships to pass through the Suez Canal. 
Israel expressed concerns about the 
prospects of relations between the two 
countries, which have not had diplomatic 
relations since 1979.39 Nevertheless, as 
the 2011 parliamentary elections clearly 
demonstrated, pro-Islamic parties will 
have the most dominant position in 
the future of Egyptian political system 
and, in this regard, one can expect that 
sensitivity about Iran’s emerging regional 
hegemony would be maintained in 
Egyptian foreign policy. 
Egyptian and Iranian interests 
ultimately clash, since the former desires 
to emerge as the leader of the Arab 
world, which is a natural position for a 
country of its size and influence. As a 
matter of fact, the el-Fatah and Hamas 
reconciliation, which Turkey was not 
able to achieve despite all its efforts, has 
become possible under the mediation of 
Egypt. Turkey’s interests lie in turning 
Egypt, which attained a democratic 
system, not into a rival but a partner. In 
this sense, for Turkey, Egypt can emerge 
as a significant geostrategic partner. 
According to Davutoğlu, “a partnership 
between Turkey and Egypt could create 
a new, democratic axis of power”.40 As 
a matter of fact, Turkish leaders voiced 
the strongest international support 
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was quite unhappy with Turkey’s soft 
diplomatic approach. This does not 
mean, however, that Turkey sides with 
the Saudi-led alliance of monarchies. 
Due to differences in interpretation of 
religion, Saudis are not very happy with 
the prospect of a Turkey-friendly Muslim 
Brotherhood-controlled chain of regimes 
from Tunisia to Egypt and mostly likely 
expanding to Syria. Furthermore, there 
is a concern that the expansion of a 
democratization wave may eventually 
encapsulate the Kingdom itself. It voices 
support to democratization wave in the 
Middle East and clearly demands ending 
all unelected repressive dictatorships. 
In his message sent to the Alliance of 
Civilizations forum held in Qatar in 
December 2011 Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdoğan made a statement that targets 
regimes beyond Syria: “We have to end 
blood and tears in the Middle East. As 
long as dictatorships that are intolerant 
of all kinds of opposing views and 
movements continue to exist, we cannot 
have peace of mind and stability.”43 
disturbed by Turkey’s more diplomatic 
approach towards Iran on the nuclear 
energy issue. While sharing a concern 
about the rise of Iranian power in the 
region, Turkey has so far persistently 
refused to take part in a Saudi-led Sunni 
alliance. As mentioned above, Turkey 
accepts the existence of Shia populations 
as a reality and has sought ties with the 
Shia community with Prime Minister 
Erdoğan paying symbolically significant 
visits to Shia religious sites in Iraq and 
holding meetings with leaders of the 
Shia community. Turkey issued warnings 
against Iran and Saudi Arabia to act with 
restraint in their clash over Bahrain 
and opposed Saudi interference in the 
island.41 Foreign Minister Davutoğlu 
held many discussions over the phone 
with numerous leaders including the 
Bahraini Prince Salman bin Hamad 
bin Isa al-Khalifa in order to ease the 
tension. Turkish officials hosted the 
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-
Faisal to discuss the topic. The Turkish 
Foreign Ministry issued a statement 
noting that Saudi forces’ entrance to 
Bahrain was a result Bahrain’s right to 
sovereignty, but nevertheless stated that 
the proportionality of the force used 
against the protestors increased after this 
event.42
Until the recent hardening of 
Turkish position vis-à-vis the Iran-led 
Shia bloc and Turkey’s support to the 
Arab League in countering the Syrian 
regime, the Saudi-led Gulf alliance 
Turkey accepts the existence 
of Shia populations as a reality 
and has sought ties with the 
Shia community with Prime 
Minister Erdoğan paying 
symbolically significant visits to 
Shia religious sites in Iraq and 
holding meetings with leaders 
of the Shia community. 
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engaged in comprehensive relations with 
authoritarian unelected Arab regimes, 
including Syria and Saudi Arabia. 
Democratic uprisings in the Arab 
world is a moment of crisis for Turkey at 
least in the sense of economic relations. 
As a trading nation short of major energy 
resources, the main priority of Turkey 
is to expand its exports to the Middle 
East. Between 2002-2010, the period 
in which AK Party was in power, Turkey 
managed to increase its volume of trade 
with the Arab world five-fold. 
The foreign trade lobby in Turkey 
was suspicious of the Arab democratic 
revolts and saw it as foreign-inspired 
disturbances keen on destroying Turkey’s 
economic expansion. According to 
calculations fed by these circles, the 
damage of the Arab spring for the 
Turkish economy is estimated to stand 
at 384 million US dollars. According 
to the Turkish Exporters Assembly, the 
biggest part of the loss in exports was in 
Libya. While Turkey has exports worth 
146.6 million dollars in January 2011, 
this figure fell to 23.5 million dollars in 
Turkey’s liberal and pro-democracy 
discourse is followed with suspicion 
by authoritarian Sunni Gulf regimes 
who, being unable to counter Iranian 
ambitions on their own, rely on the 
support of the West and even Israel. 
According to the Times of the United 
Kingdom, in the event of an Iranian 
attack, Saudi Arabia will open its 
air space to Israel, a speculation that 
Saudi regime has vehemently denied.44 
Interestingly, such overtures do not 
escape from the attention of pro-Israeli 
circles. Martin Indyk, an important 
name of the American Jewish lobby as 
the founder of the Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy (WINEP) and the 
director of Saban Centre for Middle East 
Policy at the Brookings Institute, is of the 
opinion that Israel ought to resolve its 
Palestinian question somehow and form 
an alliance with the Sunni Arabs in order 
to counter Iran’s increasing influence in 
the region.45 
Concluding Remarks: 
Turkey’s Moment in the New 
Middle East
The wave of democratization which 
grasped all Middle Eastern nations 
following the overthrow of regimes in 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya is a moment 
of crisis as well as opportunity for 
Turkish foreign policy. Turkey naturally 
chose to pursue its foreign policy with 
existing governments and in this respect 
The wave of democratization 
which grasped all Middle 
Eastern nations following the 
overthrow of regimes in Tunisia, 
Egypt and Libya is a moment of 
crisis as well as opportunity for 
Turkish foreign policy. 
Hasan Kösebalaban
112
aspiring regional powers, Turkey does 
not enjoy the unquestioned support of 
a superpower, or a deeply-rooted geo-
cultural sphere of influence, based on 
sectarian solidarity. It does not speak the 
language of the region, and, as a secular 
system, does not champion a religious 
ideology that would help spread its 
influence. History offers advantages as 
well as disadvantages for Turkey when it 
approaches the region. The only power 
that will pave the way for Turkish sphere 
of influence in the region will be its own 
democratic and economic appeal. In this 
sense, Turkey’s liberal foreign policy is 
clearly based on Realpolitik calculations 
of national interest rather than any 
idealist dreams. The political system in 
which Islam, democracy, and secularism 
coexist and result in a peaceful society 
experiencing stability and an economic 
boom in the middle of a global financial 
crisis is Turkey’s greatest export asset. 
It for this reason that, according to all 
public opinion polls, Prime Minister 
Erdoğan emerges as the most popular 
leader in the entire region.   
March. The fall in exports was recorded 
at 24 percent for Egypt and Yemen, and 
at 20 percent for Tunisia.46 Such figures, 
however, discard the long term prospects 
in which democracy in the region leads 
to major economic boom for the entire 
region, boosting Turkey’s trade volume.
However it is clear that Turkey’s 
liberal democratic system and economic 
success, coupled with the stance it took 
against Israel, creates an important 
appeal in the Arab world. As Ibrahim 
Kalin, chief advisor to Turkish Prime 
Minister, points out, a democratic and 
prosperous Arab world will reinforce 
Turkey’s power in the region.47 
Democracy is the greatest foreign 
policy asset and source of soft power 
for Turkey in the region. Unlike other 
Democracy is the greatest 
foreign policy asset and source 
of soft power for Turkey in the 
region.
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